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Philosophy and Theology

A spate of recent articles defends the permissibility and practice of killing
newborns. In their Hastings Center Report article “Ending the Life of a Newborn:
The Groningen Protocol” (January-February 2008), Hilde Lindemann and Marian
Verkerk support those who “responsibly end the lives of severely impaired new
borns” of various kinds suffering from serious illness.1 Their argument is fairly
straightforward and similar in form to the argument in favor of euthanasia generally,
another practice accepted in the Netherlands. They note that most people already
sanction the removal of life support from severely handicapped babies who have no
chance of survival (these are “Group 1” babies). “Group 2 consists of infants who
‘may survive after a period of intensive treatment, but expectations regarding their
future condition are very grim.' They include infants with severe brain abnormalities
or extensive organ damage caused by lack of oxygen. The dilemma here is whether
these infants are so badly off that they should be allowed to die.”
In the United States and Europe, there is a consensus that it is permissible to
withdraw or withhold treatment from such children, allowing them to die. “In the
Netherlands, however, if neither withholding nor withdrawing intensive treatment
will result in a speedy death, the unbearable suffering of the infant is seen as a com
pelling reason for the doctor to end its life directly.” Group 3 consists of
infants who are not and have not been dependent on intensive medical treatment
and who, with proper care, can in some cases survive many years, even into
adulthood. They have serious conditions that cannot be treated but cause terrible
suffering, such as epidermolysis bullosa, which in severe cases produces large,
painful, fluid-filled blisters and continual scarring that fuses the fingers and

1
Hilde Lindemann and Marian Verkerk, “Ending the Life of a Newborn: The Groningen
Protocol,” Hastings Center Report 38:1 (January-February 2008): 42-51.
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toes and leads to feeding and swallowing difficulties. Other severe conditions
include progressive paralysis, complete lifelong dependency, and permanent
inability to communicate in any way.

The Groningen Protocol applies to babies in all three groups, allowing for intentional
killing of newborns contingent upon informed consent given by both parents, a
certain diagnosis of “hopeless and unbearable suffering” confirmed by at least one
independent doctor, and also the consent of the physician who will kill the baby. From
Lindemann and Verkerk’s perspective, babies in Group 3 have the most pressing need
to be killed, since they could survive into adulthood with their terrible conditions.
Lindemann and Verkerk defend the Groningen Protocol for killing newborns,
which they argue has been misunderstood by errors in linguistic translation as well as
cultural misunderstandings of the Dutch context. At times, their defense of infanticide
seems to rest on a moral relativism wherein infanticide is permissible in Holland, but
perhaps not elsewhere. Moral relativism is typically not presupposed in discussions
of infanticide, since relativism opens the door to approval of sex selection abortion
and infanticide of baby girls as practiced in some parts of the world.2However, even
aside from presupposing relativism, the real problems with Lindemann and Verkerk’s
defense are foundational; they are not simply a matter of clarifying, for instance,
that many babies, not only babies with spina bifida, will be subject to the protocol.
For example, Lindemann and Verkerk presuppose the permissibility of physician-as
sisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. They take for granted that severe suffering,
understood as physical pain or psychological agony, renders worthless the life of the
one who suffers. If one rejects a self-body dualism,3their reasoning necessitates the
conclusion that suffering makes a human person worthless. If, however, all human
persons have intrinsic value, and a person’s life is simply nothing other than the per
son in his or her bodily dimension, then all human lives, even of those who severely
suffer, have intrinsic value. To cite one more problematic assumption, the authors
repeatedly offer a false dichotomy: either allow the baby to suffer or intentionally kill
the infant. No mention is made of a third alternative: making use of drugs to relieve
suffering, even if the dosage must be high enough to induce deep sleep.
At one point, the authors recognize a significant objection to their defense of
infanticide: “It is of course true that some of these babies—those, for example, who
face complete lifelong dependency—might, if kept alive, judge as adults that their
lives had been worth something to them. Much would depend, one supposes, on
how much pain and other kinds of suffering they had to endure to get to adulthood.
But that consideration is no reason to proscribe all life-ending interventions on the
basis of future suffering.” Why not? Empirical evidence shows that the overwhelm-

2See Renuka M. Sharma, “The Ethics of Birth and Death: Gender Infanticide in India,”
Journal o f Bioethical Inquiry 4.3 (December 2007): 181-192, and Vardit Rispler-Chaim,
“Contemporary Muftis between Bioethics and Social Reality: Selection of the Sex of a Fetus
as Paradigm,” Journal o f Religious Ethics 36.1 (March 2008): 53-76.
3Such dualism is also reflected in Omar Sultan Haque, “Brain Death and Its Entangle
ments: A Redefinition of Personhood for Islamic Ethics,” Journal o f Religious Ethics 36.1
(March 2008): 19, 22.
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ing majority of adults suffering from serious illness do not kill themselves. These
people have presumably known good health at some point in their lives, and so they
suffer additionally (as children from Group 3 would not) in missing what they have
lost. We have good reason to suppose that children from Group 3 would, as adults,
value their lives, a consideration that should not be simply dismissed.
Lindemann and Verkerk falsely assume that the withdrawal or withholding
of life support for an uncomprehending patient of any age depends on a judgment
that the patient’s life is no longer of value. If the burdens of a treatment outweigh its
benefits, then the treatment need not be administered or may be withdrawn. Of course
the patient’s condition will partially determine the degree to which any given treat
ment is beneficial and burdensome.4 The appropriate question, however, is whether
a given treatment is more beneficial than burdensome, not whether a person’s life is
beneficial or burdensome (lebensunwertes Leben, “life unworthy of life”).
Not limiting themselves to disabled newborns, Nicole Hassoun and Uriah Kriegel offer a different defense of killing infants in their article, “Consciousness and the
Moral Permissibility of Infanticide” (Journal o f Applied Philosophy, February 2008).
Their argument in bare outline is as follows: “It is impermissible to intentionally
kill a creature only if the creature is conscious; it is reasonable to believe that there
is some time at which human infants are not conscious; therefore, it is reasonable to
believe that it is permissible to intentionally kill some human infants.” The logic of
their premises actually entails no limitation to only “some” infants.
In arguing for this conclusion, Hassoun and Kriegel make frequent appeal to
authority: “At least since the work of Mary Ann Warren [1970s], it has been custom
ary to hold that all and only those creatures it is impermissible to intentionally kill
qualify as persons . . . Most philosophers will agree that consciousness is necessary
for personhood, and in any case, this is where we shall begin.”
Taken literally, the proposition that consciousness is necessary for personhood is
ridiculous. No one believes it is permissible to kill human beings in surgery, knocked
out in a boxing match, or rendered unconscious by car accident, and yet in all these
cases the human beings in question lack consciousness.
This difficulty could be remedied by speaking of being capable of consciousness
rather than being actually conscious. Hausoun and Kriegal state that “T is creature
conscious only if T is capable of having mental states that are state-conscious.” Could
“capable” mean the ability to exercise this power in the future? The trouble with this
modification, from the perspective of a person seeking to justify infanticide, is that
the vast majority of infants are capable of consciousness in this sense.
In order to exclude the importance of potentiality, Hassoun and Kriegel appeal
to the following example: “Consider, however, what we would say if we found out
that oysters could be made conscious upon being transported to Mars. This would

4
Christopher Kaczor, “The Culture of Life and the Quality of Life Ethic: An Either/
Or?” in Culture o f Life— Culture o f Death, ed. Luke Gormally (London: Linacre Center,
2002), 313-321.
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probably not convince most of us to stop eating oysters on Earth.” Of course, a normal
human infant develops toward consciousness in the absence of special intervention,
unlike the oysters transported to Mars, so Hassoun and Kriegel develop their example
further. “Suppose that many years from now, a space elevator is installed between
Earth and Mars, and that an oyster finds its way to the elevator. At this point, the nor
mal course of events should lead to that oyster’s becoming conscious in the absence
o f intervention. The oyster on the elevator is thus potentially conscious in the sense
in which foetuses and neonates are—it is, so to speak, en route to consciousness.
Yet it still seems intuitively permissible to kill the oyster.”
It is difficult to take such a preposterous example seriously rather than laugh
and say, “Come on, do you really think that killing a newborn baby is like killing
an oyster that could become conscious by taking a space elevator to Mars?” The
more ridiculous the example, the less useful it is in clarifying real cases at hand.
However, ifper impossible oysters were indeed rational creatures simply in need of
the right developmental conditions in order to flourish, then they would have rights
to live. But they are not, so they do not.
At what stage of development do Hassoun and Kriegel believe that human
beings begin to have a right to live? Although some claim evidence of self-aware
ness only twelve to fourteen days after birth, Hassoun and Kriegel also offer what
they take to be another plausible cutoff point for infanticide: “It is quite plausible
to take mirror self-recognition to be evidence fo r the presence of self-awareness.
The question we want to ask ourselves is at what age humans develop the ability for
mirror self-recognition. The evidence suggests that humans develop the capacity
for mirror self-recognition between the ages of eighteen months and twenty-four
months.” When killing children up to two years of age becomes a matter of debate,
one wonders whether Elizabeth Anscombe was right that certain positions reveal a
corrupt mind with which argument is not profitable.5
Recalling Anscombe’s remarks and rejecting them, at least as applicable to kill
ing newborns, Jeff McMahan’s “Infanticide” (Utilitas, June 2007) offers argument in
favour of intentionally killing infants after birth in order to transplant their organs.
The scenario he envisions, which he names “Healthy Newborn,” is as follows:
A woman dies in childbirth leaving a very premature but healthy infant, just a
few hours old. The child’s biological father died months ago and neither he nor
the mother had any living relatives. Both were reclusive and had no friends; hence
there is no one who is specially related, even indirectly, to the infant. Suppose
there are four children in the same hospital, all of whom are three years old and
need an organ transplant within the next twenty-four hours in order to survive.
Because these children’s organs have been impaired by illness, it is not possible
to wait for one to die and use his or her organs to save the others; nor is it possible
to sacrifice one (say, by lottery) to save the other three. But the newborn infant
has the right tissue type and its organs could be used to save all four.

5G. E. M. Anscombe, “M odern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33.124 (January
1958).

776

N otes & Abstracts
Most people, including those who defend abortion, are horrified by this scenario.
McMahan’s work is especially interesting because it shows an inconsistency in
defenses of abortion that seek to exclude infanticide but secure the permissibility of
abortion throughout pregnancy.
McMahan notes that many defenders of abortion believe it would be morally
permissible for a woman to have an abortion after viability if it is in the interest of
her health to do so, a scenario he calls “Selfish Abortion.” He points out that there
is no difference in intrinsic properties, and therefore no difference in moral status,
between a newborn baby and a viable human fetus. “The reason why there cannot be
intrinsic differences between newborn infants generally and viable fetuses is simply
that viable fetuses could be newborn infants if they were delivered prematurely.”
Indeed, an infant born prematurely at six months is less well developed than a child
in utero at nine months. Since McMahan also rightly supposes that birth itself is
irrelevant to the moral status of the progeny, a viable fetus and an infant have equal
moral standing. Therefore, if it is permissible for a person to intentionally kill the
viable fetus in order to eliminate health problems for one person, “Selfish Abortion,”
then it would seem to be morally licit to intentionally kill a viable fetus in order to
harvest its organs to save the lives of four children in need of organ transplantation,
a grisly scenario McMahan calls, “Altruistic Abortion.” But if “Altruistic Abortion”
is permissible, since the viable fetus and the newborn infant have the same moral
status, then it should also be permissible to kill a newborn in order to harvest his or her
organs to save the lives of four other children, the “Healthy Newborn” scenario.
McMahan also seeks to show that the pro-life position is mistaken. Why would
it be permissible to kill an animal in order to make use of its organs but impermissible
to kill a viable fetus? McMahan explores a number of possible responses.
One pro-life argument is that a viable fetus, but not a nonrational animal, has
the potential to develop cognitive capacities and that this difference makes abortion
for organ retrieval wrong but killing an animal for the same reason permissible.
McMahan rebuts this suggestion by noting a congenitally severely retarded human
fetus would not have the capacity for rationality, arguing that species membership
is morally irrelevant.
However, moral decisions bear on promoting or thwarting the flourishing of
others. Species membership is morally relevant because it gives us a benchmark by
which to judge the flourishing of an individual member of a species.6 For example,
for a human being of a certain age to be unable to read indicates a failure of that
individual to fully flourish; whereas a squirrel can flourish qua squirrel without
reading, and so even if per impossible we could teach a squirrel to read, we would
be under no obligation to do so. Since there are species-specific kinds of flourishing,

6
See Elizabeth Anderson, “Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life,” and
Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond Compassion and Humanity: Just for Non-human Animals,”
in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, ed. Cass R. Sunstein and Martha
Nussbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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the natural kind of a being matters ethically. Precisely an account of species-specific
flourishing allows us to identify and bemoan human retardation as a painful lack of
flourishing. It is in virtue of an account of species-specific flourishing that we take
it as a serious loss for them and the human community that mentally handicapped
human beings cannot fully flourish as the kinds of beings that they are. A mentally
retarded human being and a dog may be equally incapable of exercising distinctly
human reasoning and freedom, but the handicap of the human is tragic while the
rational incapacity a dog is inconsequential. This difference rests on the fact that the
human, but not the dog, cannot exercise his or her species-specific form of flourishing.
Since even mentally handicapped human beings share in a species-specific form of
flourishing ordered to the goods of rationality and freedom, they are human persons
even though they are not flourishing human persons.
McMahan’s second argument against membership in the human species as
a source of moral status is based on human and nonhuman combinations across
the transgenic spectrum: “Individuals at one end of the spectrum with only a tiny
proportion of human genes are unambiguously chimpanzees; those at the other end
with only a tiny proportion of chimpanzee genes are unambiguously human beings.
The relevant question is whether the moral status of any individual in the spectrum
depends on whether it has a sufficiently high proportion of human genes to count
as a member of the human species.” Given the Transgenic Spectrum example, Mc
Mahan believes the defender of human life is faced with a dilemma following from
the disjunction that either being a member of the species Homo sapiens is a matter
of degree or it is not.
One horn of the dilemma follows from the assumption that being a human is
not a matter of degree but rather is an all or nothing category. It is hard to believe
that a being mostly composed of chimp genes, but who had the brain of a human
being would not be deserving of our respect. Likewise, a being composed mostly
of human genes but with a chimp brain would not seem to be worthy of respect as
human. Rational functioning rather than the proportion of human genes determines
moral status.
On the other hand, if being a human is a matter of degree, reasons McMahan,
then defenders of life cannot claim that all persons have an equal right to life (the equal
wrongness thesis), since all transgenic creatures would not be equally human.
At work here is a presupposition that we need not accept. “Assume that our
working genealogical criterion of species membership is undergirded by a deeper
genetic criterion—in other words, that membership in the human species is deter
mined by the possession of a characteristically human genome, which is in fact
produced only by the fusion of gametes from human parents.” If we retain the Boethian definition of person as an individual substance of rational nature, then we can
sidestep McMahan’s argument. If creatures of mixed origin are manufactured, then
we shall have to debate about whether they should be included in the category of
rational animals. But the debate about such creations need not undermine the moral
conviction that all human beings—anyone who arises from human parents— should
be protected by law and welcomed in life. Indeed, if a species of animal is manu
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factured with a mix of human and nonhuman genes (itself morally problematic),7
then the species would have moral rights if the species had a rational nature. We
would know the nature of the beings in question by observing how healthy, mature
members of the species function.
Until we had moral clarity about the nature oftrangenetic beings, we should treat
such creatures as if they had moral rights on the supposition that we should err on the
side of protecting what very well may turn out to be animals of a rational nature. We
already know that all human beings are members of a rational species, so all human
beings merit respect as persons, including all newly born human beings.
Ch r i s t o p h e r K a c z o r , Ph .D.
Loyola Marymount University
Los Angeles, California

7National Academies, Guidelines fo r Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Wash
ington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005), 55.
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